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A B S T R A C TOver the past 50 years, health care has been making a growing
contribution to population health in many countries. Yet its benefits
are still denied to many people worldwide. This article describes how
many countries, both developed and developing, have pursued the
quest to achieve universal health care. This has been an explicitly
political process. In Europe, it emerged from a belief in solidarity, a
fear of revolution, and a changing view of the role of the state. In
developing countries, progress was more erratic, characterized by
debates about the affordability of universal health care, until it was
realized that functioning health systems were essential to deliver
development goals. Throughout, the United States has been an
exception. An analysis of progress toward universal health care,see front matter Copyright & 2013, International
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.1016/j.jval.2012.10.001
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don WC1H 9SH, UKcombining a review of existing theories and new empirical analysis,
identifies five factors as important: the strength of organized labor
and left-wing parties, adequate economic resources, absence of
societal divisions, weakness of institutions that might oppose it (such
as organized medicine), and windows of opportunity. Having noted
the substantial benefits accruing from universal health care, the
article concludes with an analysis of how universal health care is
under threat in some European countries and a warning about the
risks posed by current radical austerity policies.
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Copyright & 2013, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Health care is viewed by some as a fundamental right but by
others as a tradable commodity. In the course of just over a
century, universal health care (UHC) has gone from being an
aspiration to a reality in most industrialized countries, but not
yet all. Yet for many, especially in the developing world, it
remains no more than a dream. For those who have it, never
before has it been so insecure.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify what is
meant by UHC. A previous systematic review of the literature
found that UHC and universal health care were often conflated,
but the former was invoked more frequently when discussing
developing countries [1]. Each term, as used by researchers, was
found to express five main themes: access to care, coverage, point
of entry to the health system, a rights-based approach, and social
and economic risk protection. The definition set out by the World
Health Organization (WHO) integrates these themes:
Universal coverage is defined as access to key promotive,
preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for
all at an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access.
The principle of financial-risk protection ensures that the costof care does not put people at risk of financial catastrophe. A
related objective of health-financing policy is equity in finan-
cing: households contribute to the health system on the basis
of ability to pay. Universal coverage is consistent with WHO’s
concepts of Health for All and Primary Health Care.
It identifies the health system as a widely agreed upon means
(e.g., affordability) for achieving desired ends (e.g., financial risk
protection).
This article aims to assess the future of UHC in Europe. Our
analysis proceeds as follows: in the first section, we first review a
chronological history of how UHC came (or did not) to be. In the
second section, we assess the global prevalence of UHC and
leading theories that can account for its presence. Finally, having
evaluated the social, political, and economic drivers of UHC, we
evaluate the implications of changes to these forces over time,
particularly in light of the recent global economic crisis, to assess
challenges and threats to UHC in developing countries and Europe.A Chronology of UHC
Throughout most of recorded history, the concept of UHC was
essentially meaningless because health care had so little to offer.Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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laypeople with no formal training. What care was effective
consisted largely of basic first aid or, in some cases, herbal
remedies whose efficacy had been established by long experi-
ence. Most of what passed for health care was ineffective, or
worse, hazardous and unpleasant, such as cupping, bleeding,
purges, and similar remedies, so that the treatment was often
worse than the disease.
This situation began to change in the late 19th century with
advances in biology. The first step was to understand the actual
causes of diseases. The development of the germ theory, sup-
planting the earlier belief in miasma as a cause of disease, paved
the way for the identification of the bacteria and viruses causing
many common infections. Meanwhile Koch’s [2] postulates about
causality provided a means to match an infectious agent to a
disease process. By the mid-20th century, it was even possible to
cure diseases with early antibiotics. Similar advances were
apparent with noninfectious diseases. In 1921, the discovery of
insulin transformed a rapidly fatal disease of childhood, later to
be known as type 1 diabetes, into one compatible with a normal
lifespan. The 1950s saw a steady growth in the number of chronic
diseases for which there were effective treatments, including
hypertension, heart failure, asthma, and chronic obstructive
airways disease, and schizophrenia.
By the mid-1960s, health care could make a real difference to
the chances that someone would live or die [3]. Since that time
Western European countries began to see a steady decline in
deaths from conditions considered amenable to timely and
effective care (a pattern that was not witnessed in the Soviet
Union) [4]. It now mattered whether a population had access to
health care or not.
The first system of organized health care emerged in
Germany, as part of a series of social reforms introduced by
Bismarck, seeking to quell political incursions by the social
democrats in the late 19th century. The industrial revolution
had led to a rapid expansion in the population living in cities that
far outstripped the physical infrastructure, with large numbers
living in squalor. Their conditions provided an ideal breeding
ground not only for disease but also, as importantly from the
perspective of the elite, social revolution. Bismarck also faced
pressure from labor unions and social democrats to implement
safeguards for people if they became unemployed or fell, ill as
well as for their families should they die. These protections
included access to health care. The resulting so-called Bismarck-
ian social insurance system was limited to those, largely men, in
industrial employment. Women and children benefited to the
extent that the family breadwinner was, or had been, in such
employment. The system was financed largely by wage-related
contributions, reflecting negotiations between employers and
trade unions. Over time, governments played an increasing role
as investments in health and welfare became a means of
addressing social problems of industrialization (alcoholism,
tuberculosis, and overcrowding), forging political alliances as
well as transferring resources from the rich to the poor, from
working ages to children and old people, and from healthy to ill.
A few countries would adopt alternative approaches to UHC,
based on either local or national taxation. This often occurred
after previously implementing social insurance schemes such as
that in Germany. In some, local government took on the respon-
sibility for health care, especially where there was little industrial
infrastructure and employers associations and trade unions were
poorly developed, as was the case in Scandinavia. Other coun-
tries sharing these characteristics, such as Greece and Ireland,
were less fortunate, instead patching together composite sys-
tems that, collectively, provided coverage for most people but in
multiple parallel systems. This was the situation that prevailed in
Italy until 1978, although it would take another 14 years toaddress many of the tensions that the initial reforms left
unresolved [5]. In other countries, such as the United Kingdom,
it was a political decision by a socialist government, albeit taking
advantage of events that created political opportunities for
expanding welfare, in this case the creation of a nationwide
Emergency Medical Service during the Second World War and
the promise to military servicemen of building a better, fairer
society for all [6]. Subsequent tax-based systems, such as those
in Spain and Portugal, were also the result of political choices,
as they made the transition from dictatorship to democracy in
the 1970s.
A different form of politics had given rise to the Soviet model
of universal care, extending often very basic services to a widely
dispersed population. This model, with minor variations, fol-
lowed the Soviet advance into Eastern Europe after the Second
World War.
Similar developments were taking place in other high-income
countries. By the mid-20th century, countries such as Australia,
Canada, Israel, Japan, and New Zealand had implemented UHC in
various forms. In Australia and Canada, it involved a partnership
between the federal government and governments in the pro-
vinces, states, and territories. In New Zealand, with its small,
tightly knit population and constitutional settlement facilitating
rapid and wide-ranging legislative change, a universal tax-based
system began to be implemented in 1938. In the 1990s, it was the
turn of some of the emerging ‘‘Asian tiger’’ economies, such as
South Korea [7], Singapore, and Taiwan [8], where investments in
social welfare eventually caught up with gains in economic
development.
What lessons can be drawn from this wealth of historical
experience to provide guidance about how to accelerate progress
toward UHC?Why Do Some Countries Provide UHC and Others
Not?
As the preceding examples show, the expansion of health care
has long been a political process and one often bound up with the
growth of social welfare more generally [9]. It has tended to
require a confluence of political opportunities, available financial
resources (mainly from a functioning tax revenue base), and the
mobilization of strong, left political parties, leaders, and repre-
sentatives (including trade unions).
In an earlier article [1], three of the current authors reviewed
the various concepts informing how we view UHC and the
consequent definitions that have been adopted by various
sources. We noted how definitions varied considerably, often
emphasizing UHC when discussing poor countries but ‘‘universal
health care’’ when describing rich ones, but overall there was
little consensus about what was meant. Nearly all definitions,
however, embraced four components: access to care and/or
insurance, coverage, rights, and social and economic protection.
These themes could all be identified within the definition
put forward by the WHO (Box 1). However, in many ways, its
definition was aspirational. The question was what did it mean in
practice?
To assess which countries fulfilled the WHO definition of UHC
involved a series of pragmatic decisions, influenced in particular
by the limited availability of data on health institutions. We
adopted criteria on the books (de jure) and on the ground
(de facto) to conclude that UHC was in place where there was
legislation explicitly stating that the entire population is covered
by a defined health plan and where that population has access to
at least skilled attendance at birth [21] and 90% of them have
insurance coverage [22].
Box 1–Five determinants of universal health care
Left Power: There is extensive evidence linking the
strength of organized labor and the electoral power of
social democrat parties to the expansion of social
welfare, most notably in the work of Esping-Andersen
[10], and adapted to health care coverage in the work of
Navarro [11]. This research, taken together with other
work, has also identified the weakness of organized
labor as one factor in the absence of universal care in the
United States as well as an explanation for variations in
the provision of public investment in health care across
Europe [12]. It is notable that in many low- and middle-
income countries a powerful labor movement has yet to
emerge as in industrialized nations, partly reflecting
macroeconomic policies oriented toward attracting
foreign investors with a promise of low-wage, tax- and
union-free environments.
Economic Resources: There is also evidence linking
economic growth to the expansion of coverage. How-
ever, the reasons for such a correlation are not clear.
Wagner’s Law proposes that the scope of social insur-
ance expands as countries become wealthier [13]. The
so-called Leviathan theory considers that coverage is
increased when countries are running budget surpluses
[14]. This is linked to a notion that some countries are
‘‘too poor for UHC,’’ lacking a sufficiently functioning tax
revenue base to finance public goods. Another view is of
‘‘convergence,’’ that as developing countries catch-up
with developed countries, so too will their social welfare
systems [15].
Societal Division: Societies that are divided on ethnic,
linguistic, or religious lines (‘‘status’’ groups) also tend to
contribute fewer funds to public welfare, including
health care. Work by Alesina and Glaeser [16] has
demonstrated how redistributive policies, of which
universal coverage is an example, are less likely to be
supported in societies that are more divided. They
present a compelling case for the role of race in limiting
welfare provision in the United States, with those states
where most poor people are black being least generous.
Four of the present authors have extended this work
globally, showing that countries with greater ethnic and
religious heterogeneity have had lesser investment in
health care and, as a result, slower progress toward the
child and maternal health Millennium Development
Goals [17]. The authors also found a significant relation-
ship between income inequality, controlling for income
levels, and a lower fraction of spending on health care.
Existing Institutions:When a country reaches a point at
which it might pursue universal coverage, such as a
particular level of economic development, other factors
may constrain the development of the health system.
Thus, the existence of powerful vested interests, such as
a medical profession dependent on informal payments
or a private insurance industry that can call on vast
resources to lobby politicians, may be sufficient to block
progress. It is generally thought that a reliance on
private finance at early stages of health care system
development could embed vested interests, making it
more difficult subsequently to expand the public sector’s
role in health care finance and provision. These initial
conditions create a situation of ‘‘path dependency,’’
whereby future paths are shaped by past choices and
present circumstances.
Windows of Opportunity: Windows of opportunity
typically involve both an exogenous shock and political
leadership to capitalize on it. The shock forces the
widespread realization that the status quo is not
sustainable; the political leadership suggests an alter-
native. Examples include the actions of Atlee, in the
United Kingdom, and de Gaulle, in France, in the
aftermath of the Second World War. For example, de
Gaulle was able to deflect criticism from industrialists of
his expansion of health insurance by noting how they
had collaborated with the occupying Germans [18]. A
recent review of the experiences of five low- andmiddle-
income countries that were making progress toward
‘‘good health at low costs’’ (also referred to as ‘‘good
health in spite of poverty’’ [19]) identified several such
examples, such as the war of independence in Bangla-
desh, the collapse of the USSR in Kyrgyzstan, and the
overthrow of the military government in Ethiopia [20].
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countries met the first legislative criterion but, of these, only 58
met the access criteria (Figs. 1 and 2). Several things were
striking. First, many countries had achieved UHC when they
were still quite poor. For example, the United Kingdom did so in
1948 when its gross domestic product, in real 2005 US $, was
under US $5000 per capita. Clearly, the scope of health care has
increased enormously since then, but this, taken with more
recent examples such as Thailand and Rwanda, suggests that
countries can achieve universal coverage with at least a basic
package at relatively low levels of income. Second, we observed
that the presence of the legislative criterion did appear to
accelerate progress, likely by providing an organizing platform
for advocates so as to strengthen social movements for UHC.
An enormous amount has been written about the factors that
give rise to countries pursuing universal coverage, drawing on a
wide range of disciplines including economics, political science,
and sociology. As summarized by Navarro [11], these can be
disaggregated into four broad theories. Pluralist theories see
multiple players competing in a political market to influence
policy. Institutional theories focus on institutions and interest
groups that have differing degrees of power and are impacted by
policies in different ways. These institutions typically include the
medical profession, health care insurers and providers, and
pharmaceutical companies. Development theories suggest that
as countries become wealthier, they will adopt many of the
characteristics of developed countries, noting in particular the
association among gross domestic product, increasing fractions
of public health spending in gross domestic product, and pro-
gress toward universal coverage. Class theories see the provision
of health care as a result of a struggle between those providing
capital and those providing labor in the economy. In particular,
these theories draw attention to the role played by organized
labor in advancing the interests of the population and of elite
groups in opposing or supporting their advancement.
The multiplicity of theoretical frameworks, all attracting
greater or lesser support from empirical evidence, indicate that
there is no single explanation for why a country decides to
pursue universal coverage. However, a number of enabling and
inhibiting factors can be identified that ‘‘load the historical dice’’
for the development of UHC. Of the many factors, the five most
prominent are the strength of organized labor and those left-
leaning parties that represent them, the availability of resources
(including economic growth), potential for building shared iden-
tities and public goals (as seen in more homogenous societies),
path dependency (so that the conditions today impact the
possibilities for tomorrow), and windows of opportunity (often
created by exogenous events such as financial crises, natural
disasters or wars, or political transitions), as summarized in
Box 1. To varying degrees, these factors affect the scope of
UHC in developed and developing countries. For example, limited
Fig. 1 – Global prevalence of universal health care, 2009.
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be a hindrance to UHC in developing than in developed countries,
whereas class conflicts are likely to apply to all countries. As we,
and others, have argued elsewhere, these factors can best be
understood in a unified framework when viewed together as part
of a social movement toward UHC [1,9,23].Current Challenges and Threats to UHC
The economic crisis that appeared in 2008 has opened a political
window of opportunity for those who were hostile to the
European postwar welfare state. Apocalyptic predictions
appeared in the media describing the purported consequences
of aging populations, new technologies, and greater popular
expectations. Despite much evidence to the contrary, health care
was portrayed as a drain of resources rather than an investment
in those whose labors would drive economic growth [24–27].
Politicians began to ask whether their health systems were
‘‘sustainable.’’ Few actually called for UHC to be abandoned.
Instead, they developed policies that would, in time, encourage
those who could afford to do so to opt out by purchasing private
insurance. This strategy included limiting publicly funded benefitFig. 2 – Year of UHC legislation and levels of GDP per capita, 44 c
the University of Pennsylvania world tables series 6.3 and corre
data sources are from Bordo and colleagues using alternative GD
lack of GDP data [1]. GDP, gross domestic product; UHC, universpackages, introducing co-payments, and allowing waiting times
to increase. It became clear that the expansion of health care to
most or all of the population was not a one-way path toward
growth. Here, lessons could have been learned from the experi-
ence of Chile, where the welfare state was largely dismantled by
General Pinochet following the coup that overthrew Salvador
Allende. Yet, there was no excuse for failing to learn this lesson,
given how Naomi Klein used Chile as an example of how those
opposed to collective action could triumph against the will of
the people [28]. Meanwhile, developing countries, particularly
India and China, continue to post double-digit growth rates—an
expansion of available resources—which creates potential for
health care expansion. How will these threats and opportunities
affect the evolution of health care systems in developing and
developed countries?
The Future of Developing Countries: Political Economy of
Welfare Expansion
In developing countries the situation continues to be quite
different than that in developed countries [19]. This is despite a
commitment by the countries of the world, in Alma-Ata in 1978
[29], to the principle of universal primary health care. Theountries. Notes. Real GDP in constant 2005 US dollars is from
ct for purchasing-power differentials and inflation. Pre-1950
P estimation methods. New Zealand not included because of
al health coverage; USD, US dollars.
Box 2–Macroeconomic factors and UHC in China
In China, the dismantling of the barefoot doctor scheme
in the 1970s left large numbers of people, especially in
the countryside, without access to care. Not unreason-
ably, many began to hoard money lest they or their
families sustained catastrophic illness. Yet, by not
spending this money, they contributed to China’s ever-
greater trade imbalance with the rest of the world, with
global economic consequences as Chinese money un-
derpinned the American subprime lending boom [43,44].
Meanwhile, the microeconomic consequences were also
being seen, as ordinary Chinese people protested against
what they saw as health providers profiting excessively
from their plight. The government had to act, and it did,
introducing and extending the scope of a series of new
insurance schemes [45].
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sipated, as organizations such as the United Nations Interna-
tional Children’s Emergency Fund, the World Bank, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and others concluded that universal care
was unaffordable and it would be better to focus on a few priority
interventions, and in particular the growth monitoring, oral
rehydration, breast-feeding, and immunization quartet [30,31].
This approach of minimal public investment in health care
resonated with those who wished to limit government spending
and open opportunities for private sector development in health
(‘‘Washington Consensus’’ [32]). Nevertheless, growth monitoring,
oral rehydration, breast-feeding, and immunization achieved
much, with large falls in infant and child mortality, but this
began to reverse with the HIV epidemic and by 2000 it was
increasingly recognized that these ‘‘silver bullet’’ interventions
were no more than a first step; much more was needed to build
health systems that could adapt to varied and evolving
population needs.
A major stimulus to expanding health service provision in
low- and middle-income nations was the adoption of the Millen-
nium Development Goals in the year 2000, whereby all United
Nations member states agreed to measurable goals to alleviate
poverty by 2015. Among them were a series of health-related
goals, involving reductions in infant, child, and maternal mor-
tality, as well as measures to reduce the spread of HIV, tubercu-
losis, and malaria. The adoption of these goals led to a ‘‘Big Push’’
among rich countries to raise the substantial resources needed if
they were to be achieved [33].
Although progress was made in reducing maternal and child
mortality, it was highly uneven and most countries of sub-
Saharan Africa lagged behind [34]. While there are several
underlying reasons for inadequate progress (including general
economic underperformance [35], the ‘‘Great Recession’’ of
2007–2009 [36], an evolving burden of chronic noncommunicable
diseases [37], and donor displacement of public funding particu-
larly in countries facing international pressure to reduce govern-
ment spending [38]), it soon became apparent that progress was
being constrained by health systems that lacked the capacity to
absorb the additional resources (one reason for the well-known
‘‘inverse care law,’’ whereby populations with the greatest health
care needs tend to receive the least amount of funding and care
[39]). An effective response to longstanding health issues needed
to go beyond a minimal package of low-cost interventions and
address the challenges of expanding primary health care to
entire populations [40]. Yet, a few countries showed what could
be done. Rwanda viewed health as a nation-building strategy
following the genocide. It now offers a basic benefit package to
92% of its population, using contributions of approximately US $2
per person per year [41,42]. Thailand has scaled up its original ‘‘50
Baht’’ scheme to cover its entire population [20]. Several middle-
income countries currently are contemplating universal health
coverage, including India and South Africa, but, overall, there has
been relatively little progress in the past decade. China’s
dismantling of UHC in the late-1970s led to macroeconomic
problems, creating, in turn, a renewed pressure for the reestab-
lishment of UHC, as described further in Box 2.
Future prospects for UHC in emerging economies are mixed,
for several reasons. They have less well-developed and poorly
mobilized left organizations, which historically played a key role
in ensuring that public welfare investment kept pace with
economic growth. Their economic models have also relied heav-
ily on extensive foreign investment and integration in global
markets, which has constrained their ability to raise taxes and
public revenue, a critical precondition for establishing
viable UHC.
In addition, there is a strong private-sector alliance of insur-
ance companies, medical associations, and pharmaceuticalcompanies that profits from privatized health care finance and
delivery. Aid agencies such as the US Agency for International
Development often place conditionalities such as demands to
support employer-based coverage or other mechanisms of insur-
ance that create scope for private sector development. Finally,
wealthy elites in fast-growing, yet highly unequal countries are
able to opt for high-priced, private care, creating a system where
they see little benefit in having their tax funds invested. Hence,
despite rhetoric by populist political leaders to invoke health as a
campaign platform and unifying ideology, the prospect for elites
to rally behind UHC is not strong in the absence of strong civil
society and dissident movements, of the kind that helped spur
UHC in South Korea in response to Park Chung Hee’s dictatorship.The Future of Europe: Political Economy of Austerity
Welfare systems are no longer viewed as stable or resilient as
they once were thought to be in Europe [12]. Esping-Andersen [10]
has argued that the ‘‘consolidation’’ of welfare states after the
Second World War depended crucially on the political alliances of
the new middle classes. By no means are these alliances stable or
secure. In Anglo-Saxon countries, the welfare state predomi-
nantly has catered to the working class and poor (with, at the
time of writing, the important exception of the National Health
Service in the United Kingdom), whereas in Scandinavian coun-
tries, these classes were in some cases directly created by state
policies. It is now becoming clear that economic change, com-
bined with political cleavages, make possible the reversal and
retrenchment of the welfare state, including health.
There are several examples of where UHC was gained and
later lost. Examples include Chile, as noted above, but also a
number of countries that emerged from the USSR and were
plunged into severe economic crises, such as Georgia and
Armenia [46]. Yet, even in high-income countries, the welfare
state, and thus, potentially, universal coverage, is under threat.
Debates about the future of social welfare in Europe are set
against a backdrop of intense pressure for austerity but enduring
popularity of welfare programs [47]. Recent debt crises in Europe,
resulting from bailouts of the financial sector, have strengthened
the arguments of those promoting the case that existing welfare
systems are unaffordable [12]. Of course, they fail to explain why
they believe the alternative, such as that existing in the United
States and costing much more, would save money. Fundamentally,
even though many already pay a far smaller share of their income
in taxes than do the poor [48], they want to pay less into a system
from which they perceive little benefit and resent supporting
people with whom they feel they have little or nothing in common
Box 3–American exceptionalism
Throughout the past century, one country has stood out
from the rest. This was a country that could clearly
afford to provide coverage for its entire population; it
was spending almost 18% of its national wealth on
health care, or approximately twice that in other
industrialized countries. Yet it left a substantial propor-
tion with access only to emergency care and many more
at risk of financial ruin should they suffer illnesses that
cost more than their often highly restrictive insurance
would cover. It is, of course, the United States.
Many previous attempts to extend health coverage
in the United States had met with mixed success.
The ‘‘New Deal’’ was set to include greater health care
protections but succumbed to opposition from clini-
cians. The creation of Social Security, serving the elderly,
established a model of contributory social insurance
for one group, but impeded the universal expansion
of coverage [49]. The establishment of Medicare and
Medicaid by Lyndon Johnson in 1965 built on this
system, but attempts at system-wide restructuring, like
the Clinton proposals in the 1990s, ended in failure.
Meanwhile, despite spending more than any other
industrialized nation, the failings of the American
health systems were becoming increasingly apparent.
Outcomes from common treatable diseases were lagging
ever further behind those in other industrialized coun-
tries [50]. Medical expenses had become the main cause
of personal insolvency. The cost of paying for a failing
system was becoming unsustainable for those employ-
ers offering coverage to their staff. The filmmaker
Michael Moore graphically illustrated how ludicrous this
was in his production ‘‘Sicko,’’ which contrasted the
health care available to those detained by the American
military in Guantanamo Bay with the absence of care for
those who had been injured in the rescue operation
following the attacks on New York on September 11,
2001. In 2008, newly elected President Obama committed
himself to a major expansion of coverage. It would still
be far from universal, denying care to illegal migrants
and allowing others, such as certain religious groups, to
opt out. It would leave about 23 million without cover.
But it would extend coverage to about 25 million who
currently lack it.
His proposals initially attracted widespread popular
support but, influenced by an aggressive political
campaign by an increasingly right wing Republican
Party, and especially the new Tea Party movement,
popular support has rapidly ebbed. However, contrary to
what many neoliberal commentators believed, the
Supreme Court has rejected a challenge to the legisla-
tion on the basis of its impact on interstate trade as it
compels people to purchase health coverage. The
legislation is now being enacted and although it will
continue to face attack from Republicans, it is already
being implemented.
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American exceptionalism, as described in Box 3 [51].
Those who seek to dismantle the welfare state, however, face
at least three significant obstacles: First, as they live in democ-
racies, they must persuade the majority of the population to vote
against their own interests, instead supporting the interests of
the tiny minority, typically less than 0.1% of the population, at
the top. The main channel for achieving this shift in cultural
perceptions is through the media. The first step is to create animage of the undeserving poor, something that is increasingly
easy in societies that are becoming more heterogeneous as a
consequence of migration. Typically, they use labels such as
‘‘bogus asylum seekers’’ or ‘‘benefits scroungers,’’ overemphasiz-
ing the false-positive ‘‘type-1’’ errors (people who access services
who should not) over the much larger ‘‘type-2’’ errors (people who
fail to access services even though they should).
Second, critics of welfare must attempt to undermine support
from the middle classes who played a key role in past welfare
consolidation. To create such cleavages, it is necessary to remove
the benefits flowing to the middle classes from welfare, such as
free university education, child care, and social care in old age,
instead limiting support to the very poor. In this way, the middle
classes see the welfare state as being for others, something they
pay for but get nothing in return: severing the link between tax
euros in and benefits out.
Last, those assaulting welfare must develop their policies
insidiously, so that few realize what is happening until it is too
late. Those who do are labeled pejoratively as scare mongering.
This recalls the scene in Douglas Adams’ famous book The
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy in which the book’s hero Arthur
Dent learns, at the same time, that his house is about to be
demolished to make way for a new road and the earth is to be
demolished to make way for an interstellar expressway [52].
On protesting that no one warned him, he was told, with respect
to the former, that the sign was ‘‘on display in the bottom of a
locked filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign
outside the door saying ‘Beware of the Leopard,’’’ while the
warning notice of the latter was clearly displayed, but on a
nearby planet.
We hope that this overview serves as a warning to everyone
now living in countries that enjoy UHC. The safety, security, and
reassurance that it has provided cannot be taken for granted. For
those who do not, the quest continues, and we hope that by
understanding past successes and failures, the quest can be
accelerated.
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